Filed: Oct. 28, 1999
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: Tia GRAHAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois corporation; and Jean Estes, Defendants-Appellees. No. 98-6871. United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit Oct. 28, 1999. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. (No. CV-97-N-2039-S), Edwin L. Nelson, Judge. Before BLACK and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior Circuit Judge. PER CURIAM: The Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (FMLA), ensures
Summary: Tia GRAHAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois corporation; and Jean Estes, Defendants-Appellees. No. 98-6871. United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit Oct. 28, 1999. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. (No. CV-97-N-2039-S), Edwin L. Nelson, Judge. Before BLACK and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior Circuit Judge. PER CURIAM: The Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (FMLA), ensures t..
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Tia GRAHAM, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois corporation; and Jean Estes,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 98-6871.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit
Oct. 28, 1999.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. (No. CV-97-N-2039-S),
Edwin L. Nelson, Judge.
Before BLACK and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
The Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (FMLA), ensures that employees may
take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave due to, among other things, serious medical conditions. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a)(1)(D). As the district court reasoned, a plaintiff suffers no FMLA injury when she receives all the
leave she requests, and indeed is paid for most of it. Nor does she have a claim for retaliation based on a
supervisor's memorandum warning the employee against future non-FMLA absences.
Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Defendants is affirmed based upon
the holding and the rationale contained in the district court's September 28, 1998, order, a copy of which is
attached as Appendix A hereto.1
AFFIRMED.
APPENDIX A
TIA GRAHAM, Plaintiff,
1
On September 30, 1998, the district court amended its order to remand Graham's state law claims to state
court instead of dismissing them. The amendment does not affect the basis for our affirmance.
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., et al., Defendants.
CV 97-N-2039-S.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Sept. 28, 1998.
EDWIN L. NELSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Memorandum of Opinion
This action was brought pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 28 U.S.C. § 2601
et seq., and various Alabama state laws. With regard to the FMLA, the plaintiff alleges that State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (hereinafter "State Farm") and defendant Jean Estes, a senior occupational
health nurse at State Farm, violated her rights under the statute by discriminating against her, harassing her,
denying her FMLA protections, retaliating against her for taking leave protected under the FMLA, and
constructively discharging her, among other things. Graham also asserts claims on theories of negligence,
negligent hiring and training, fraud, and breach of contract, and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,
reinstatement, back pay, and compensatory and punitive damages.
The matter is presently before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by State Farm on
July 30, 1998. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision. Upon due consideration,
defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
I. Statement of Facts.1
1
In developing the statement of facts in this opinion, the court considered those facts claimed to be
undisputed by the parties, the parties' respective responses to those claims, and the court's own examination
of the evidentiary record. These are the "facts" for summary judgment purposes only. They may not be the
actual facts. Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 (11th Cir.1994),
cert. denied, USX Corp. v. Cox,
513 U.S. 1110,
115 S. Ct. 900,
130 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1995).
2
Plaintiff Tia Graham was hired by State Farm on July 6, 1993, to work as a communications operator
at State Farm's Alabama-Mississippi Regional office in Birmingham, Alabama. Depo. of T. Graham at 35.
As a communications operator, her job duties included answering the telephone and transferring calls, locking
and unlocking certain doors, and keying in car mileage on the computer. Id. at 35-38, 43-45. At some point
during Graham's employment, she was also given the responsibility of processing certain communications
invoices.
Id. at 39, 40, 47. Her assigned working hours were 8:00 a.m. to 4:15 p.m.
Id. at 46. While
employed by State Farm, Graham was an employee-at-will. Aff. of Brian Lancaster at ¶ 8.
Angela Graham was hired at State Farm as a management trainee and received a year of management
training. Depo. of A. Graham at 13-14, 21. In November of 1994, she became plaintiff's immediate
supervisor. Id. at 25; Depo. of T. Graham at 62. Angela Graham reported to Assistant Manager Jan
Youngman and Administrative Services Manager Marvin Reeves. Depo. of A. Graham at 14.
Angela Graham received Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) training at the Alabama Regional
office; the FMLA training session was for State Farm management and lasted less than one day. Depo. of
A. Graham at 46-49. At the training, Angela Graham was "taught our responsibility ... and about the FMLA,"
the main thrust of which "was I was not a medical doctor, and that it wasn't my responsibility to discuss
illnesses with employees, that if an employee wanted FMLA protection, it was their responsibility to seek
that protection and to work with medical on getting it." Id. at 46-48, 123-24. Angela Graham received no
other training or education on the FMLA or State Farm's FMLA policies.
Id. at 123-24.
State Farm's FMLA policy is that an employee must provide a request under the FMLA within two
days of returning to work in order for State Farm to designate FMLA protection; employees do not receive
FMLA protection from State Farm if they do not make the request within two days. Depo. of Jean Estes at
157-58. Pursuant to State Farm's policies, an employee must complete a written request form in order to
receive FMLA protection for an absence from State Farm. Id. at 158-59. State Farm does not consider the
completion of a Medical Certification Form by a doctor a request for FMLA protection.
Id. at 163-64. If
3
State Farm receives a Medical Certification Form but no request form, State Farm does not consider the
absence protected by the FMLA. Id. at 163-65.
At State Farm, only non-FMLA protected absences resulted in absentee memos. Depo. of A. Graham
at 55. Angela Graham does not know who at State Farm determines whether an employee's absence is FMLA
protected; she just looks at records from her department secretary that shows a list of absences that are
nonprotected. Id. at 57. Pursuant to State Farm's FMLA policy, the occupational health nurse at State Farm's
Alabama-Mississippi Regional office is charged with the responsibility of making determinations regarding
the FMLA. Depo. of Thomas Goya at 49, 58, 59, 71. The senior occupational health nurse at State Farm's
Alabama-Mississippi Regional office is Jean Estes, Depo. of Jean Estes at 53. Estes has been employed by
State Farm since 1961.
Id. at 35-36. Estes received at least a day and a half of training regarding the FMLA
at State Farm's headquarters in Illinois.
Id. at 69-70. Estes made the FMLA decisions; if she had any
question regarding an FMLA designation, she could go to her manual, to management or to corporate.
Id.
at 162-63. Estes would not make an FMLA determination on information obtained verbally from an
employee: "To me, if anything is not in writing, it didn't happen."
Id. at 77-78.
State Farm established an FMLA committee consisting of employees from several different
departments of State Farm to look at State Farm policies and assist in drafting new policies to comply with
the FMLA. Depo. of Thomas Goya at 34-35. Thomas Goya, Kathy Leff, Sverre Olsen (State Farm in-house
corporate counsel), and others were members of the FMLA committee. Id. at 35. Drafts of the FMLA policy
were submitted to corporate counsel,
Id. at 38, and an FMLA policy was adopted by State Farm.
Id. at 37.
The State Farm FMLA policy "did not permit absences covered under FMLA to result in negative
employment action against an employee when absences were considered covered or protected by the FMLA."
Id. at 49. Under State Farm's policy, if an absence qualified under the FMLA, it would be an FMLA
protected absence.
Id. at 50.
4
State Farm nurses were trained on how to administer the FMLA policy. Id. at 52. After the initial
training sessions, State Farm corporate did not conduct subsequent FMLA training sessions.
Id. at 52-53.
The primary responsibility for determining whether an employee's absence was one that was covered
by the FMLA was on the Medical Department, and those determinations were generally made by the nurse,
pursuant to State Farm's policy. Id. at 58-59. Supervisors had the responsibility to assist the Medical
Department (the nurse) in determining whether the employee met a one-year employment requirement and
the 1250 hour requirement, as well as whether the employee had exhausted his or her allotment of FMLA.
Id. at 56-57.
During plaintiff's employment, she received an employee benefits binder which includes a summary
of State Farm's policy regarding the FMLA. Depo. of T. Graham at 185, Ex. 11. However, plaintiff does not
recall reading the FMLA policy or it being a part of her binder. Id. at 185-86. Plaintiff attended an FMLA
training course given to State Farm employees on August 1, 1995.
Id. at 129-131. Plaintiff received written
materials concerning State Farm's FMLA policy at the training session.
Id. at 183.
On Tuesday, August 29, 1995, plaintiff and her daughter, Nicole Delgado, (who was then age 13)
were in a car accident. Id. at 13, 77. Plaintiff and her daughter were stopped at a red light in their car when
a truck hit them from behind.
Id. at 77, 110. Immediately after the accident, plaintiff was examined at
Carraway Methodist Hospital, where she complained of soreness in the left shoulder and neck.
Id. at 109;
Depo. of Marc Husid at 12. X-rays of plaintiff's spine were taken at the hospital and were normal. Depo. of
Marc Husid at 12, 13. Plaintiff was released from the hospital after two to three hours. Depo. of T. Graham
at 109.
That evening, plaintiff called Jan Youngman to notify him that she had been in a car accident. Id.
at 113, 114. Plaintiff saw her family practitioner, Dr. John Holloway, on August 31, 1995.
Id. at 108, 109.
On August 31, 1995, Dr. Holloway indicated that Graham could return to work on Tuesday, September 5,
1995. Monday, September 4, 1995 was Labor Day and plaintiff was not scheduled to work that day.
5
Youngman "told [plaintiff] not to worry about it, just stay off until Monday and just relax and just stay out
until Monday, there would be no problem." Id. at 114, 115. Prior to the auto accident, Plaintiff's State Farm
records do not show attendance or other employment problems on the part of Plaintiff. Depo. of Jean Estes,
Ex. 22. Angela Graham, as Plaintiff's supervisor, had no trouble with Plaintiff up to that point. Depo. of A.
Graham at 33.
When plaintiff returned to work on September 5, 1995, she checked in with State Farm's senior
occupational health nurse, defendant Jean Estes. Depo. of T. Graham at 116. Plaintiff presented Estes with
a return to work form dated August 31, 1995 from Dr. Holloway which stated:
This is to certify that Tia Graham has been under my care for the following: car accident and is able
to return to work on September 5, 1995.
Depo. of T. Graham, Ex. 4. Plaintiff claims that as she checked in with Estes on September 5, 1995, she told
Estes that she was "probably going to have to go for physical rehab for this condition." Id. at 117. Plaintiff
also claims she asked Estes if there was "an Act or something that would cover [her] in case [she] had to go
on leave to go to therapy."
Id. Estes represented to Plaintiff on that day that the time in which she could claim
FMLA protection for her absences on August 30 and 31 and September 1, 1995, and generally for the injuries
Plaintiff suffered as
APPENDIX—Continued
a result of her automobile accident, were waived because Plaintiff had not claimed FMLA protection for the
injuries she sustained in the accident within two days. Id. at 212-15. Estes told Plaintiff that she could never
request FMLA protection relating to her injuries from the auto accident.
Id. Estes told plaintiff that plaintiff's
supervisor, Angela Graham, "is very nice, that she would work with me any way if I had to take time off in
the day to go to therapy, she just said explain it to Angela ... and she would give [her] no problem with it."
Id. at 117, 118, 129.
6
After the initial three days of absence after the accident, plaintiff was present at work until September
14, 1995. Id., Ex. 8. Plaintiff was also absent on September 20, 1995, and such absence was classified as a
paid vacation day.
Id., Ex. 6. Plaintiff was absent for a few hours on September 25 and 27—time which was
classified as "Paid Doctor."
Id. Plaintiff worked every scheduled day in October, only missing one hour and
forty-five minutes on October 23, 1995—time which was classified as "Paid Doctor."
Id. Plaintiff worked
every scheduled day in November 1995.
Id. Plaintiff missed only one full day in December 1995—December
4, 1995—which was classified as paid sickness family.
Id. Plaintiff took a half day of paid vacation on
December 22, 1995.
Id. Plaintiff was absent on January 3, 1996, and such absence was classified as paid sick
leave.
Id. Plaintiff was absent two hours and fifteen minutes on January 10, 1996, and such absence was
classified as personal time.
Id. Plaintiff was absent two and a half hours on January 18, 1996, and such
absence was classified as paid doctor.
Id. Plaintiff was absent on January 24, 1996, and such absence was
classified as personal time.
Id. Plaintiff was absent five and a half hours on February 14, 1996, and such
absence was classified as personal time.
Id. Plaintiff was absent on March 18, 1996, and such absence was
classified as paid sick leave.
Id. Plaintiff was absent April 2 and 3, 1996, and such absences were classified
as leave of absence.
Id. Plaintiff was absent April 24, 1996, and such absence was classified as paid sick
leave.
Id. Plaintiff was absent approximately four hours on May 8, 1996, and such absence was classified
as paid doctor.
Id.
State Farm received a May 13, 1996 letter from Dr. Fox, a chiropractor, indicating that he was
treating Plaintiff from May 13 until May 20, 1996 for injuries relating to the auto accident and was taking
her off work as he had "found that the ergonomics of her work station to be reducing the efficacy of her
therapy." Depo. of Jean Estes at 147, Ex. 17; Depo. of T. Graham, Ex. 6. Plaintiff was absent approximately
45 minutes on May 13, 1996, and such absence was classified as paid doctor. Depo. of T. Graham, Ex. 6.
Plaintiff was absent May 14-17, 1996, and such absences were classified as paid sick leave.
Id.
7
Plaintiff was absent a half day on June 5, 1996, and such absence was classified as paid vacation.
Id., Ex. 8. Plaintiff was absent on June 12, 1996, and such absence was classified as paid sick family.
Id.
Plaintiff was absent a half day on June 24, 1996, and such absence was classified as paid vacation.
Id.
Plaintiff was absent one hour and forty-five minutes on June 28, 1996, and such absence was classified as
personal time.
Id. Plaintiff was absent on July 9, 1996, and such absence was classified as paid sick leave.
Id. Plaintiff was absent thirty minutes on July 10 and two hours and forty-five minutes on July 11, 1996; the
absence on July 11 was classified as paid doctor.
Id. Plaintiff was absent two hours on July 16, 1996, and
such absence was classified as personal time.
Id.
Dr. Crompton, one of Plaintiff's physicians, provided a form to State Farm indicating that Plaintiff
was unable to work on July 17, 18 and 19 because of chronic neck pain relating to the auto accident and that
she was awaiting her appointment with him. Depo. of Jean Estes at 145-46, Ex. 15. Plaintiff was absent July
17-19, 1996, and such absences were classified as paid sick leave. Depo. of T. Graham, Ex. 8. X-rays of
plaintiff's neck were done on July 19, 1996, and were normal. Depo. of Marc Husid at 16.
Plaintiff was absent three hours and fifteen minutes on July 23, 1996, and such absence was classified
as paid doctor. Depo. of T. Graham, Ex. 8.
Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Marc Husid on July 23, 1996. Depo. of Marc Husid at 11. She
reported that she had experienced pain in the neck ever since the auto accident which increased in severity
and radiated into both sides of the head and the low back region once or twice a week, and that such pain was
accompanied by nausea, blurred vision, pain in the eyes, and occasional tingling in the arms. Id. at 14. She
also told Dr. Husid that the treatments by plaintiff's chiropractor "feel wonderful" but had no lasting effect.
Id. Dr. Husid found that "[s]he was moderately tender to palpation, or general pressure, over the neck and
upper back muscles," and that her range of motion was "a little bit limited in all directions."
Id. at 22, 24.
Dr. Husid prescribed two medications for headaches, referred her to physical therapy for soft tissue therapy
on her neck and upper back, and asked her to return in three to four weeks.
Id. at 35. State Farm received
8
a copy of the July 23 referral to physical therapy from Plaintiff and put it in her medical file. Depo. of Jean
Estes at 136, Ex. 14. When plaintiff requested work release two days later, Dr. Husid testified that he told
his assistant, "I don't see any reason why [the plaintiff] can't work. I know it's inconvenient, but have her try
to." Depo. of Marc Husid at 38.
On July 24, 1996, plaintiff was present at work. Depo. of T. Graham, Ex. 8. On that day, Angela
Graham met with plaintiff to discuss plaintiff's absences and informed her that the following memo was being
placed in her personnel file:
Memo
To: Tia Graham
From: Angela Graham, Communications Supervisor
Date: July 24, 1996
Re: Excessive Absences
I am submitting this memo to your Personnel Shield to stress our concern about your excessive
non-FMLA protected absence record. You have been absent from work 172 hours since June 1,
1995. These non-FMLA protected hours include:
104:30 hours PSL
37:25 hours PSF
15:30 hours LA
15:15 hours PD
You are aware of our concern regarding your non-FMLA protected absences as I have counseled with
you several times regarding this subject. Communications is staffed at the appropriated level.
Absences from your primary job of the switchboard and secondary job of invoice processing places
unnecessary burdens on the unit's work flow and on fellow employees. You are aware of the
importance of taking responsibility for your job and the priority that should be placed on attendance.
Further, non-FMLA protected absences could directly affect all future permission policy absences
and result in disciplinary action. As your supervisor, I am available at all times to help you resolve
this concern. We will sit down together and follow up on the contents of this memo in thirty days,
August 24, 1996.
Signature:
9
Angela Graham
Supervisor
Tia Graham
Jan Youngman
Asst. Manager
cc: Human Resources
Id. at 141-43, Ex. 7; Depo. of A. Graham at 63.
After the meeting with Angela Graham, plaintiff went to see Jean Estes and showed her a copy of
the memo. Depo. of T. Graham at 145. Estes told plaintiff it was too late to get FMLA protection for her
absences and that she should try to get her future appointments in the late afternoon. Id. at 146. According
to the plaintiff, Estes also told her not to get Angela Graham angry with her because, "once a supervisor gets
on your back or gets upset at State Farm, they will stay on your back."
Id. at 145.
After July 24, 1996, plaintiff never again reported to work at State Farm. Id. at 159, Ex. 8. On July
25, 1996, plaintiff called Dr. Husid's office and asked for a work release for one to two weeks. Depo. of Marc
Husid at 36, 37, Ex. 2. At that time, Dr. Husid denied plaintiff's request to take her off work because he did
not "see any reason why she can't work."
Id. at 38.
On August 2, 1996, plaintiff sent a letter to Marvin Reeves, with a copy to Angela Graham and Jean
Estes, informing State Farm of her need for continuing medical treatment and requesting a leave of absence
through August 20, 1996. Depo. of T. Graham at 9, Ex. 9. Plaintiff admits that no one at State Farm ever told
plaintiff she could not have time off. Id. at 173. Estes sent a blank Medical Certification Form to plaintiff
for her to have her doctor complete on August 5, 1996. Depo. of Estes at 121-122, Ex. 5. She also sent a form
for plaintiff to sign which authorized plaintiff's doctors to release medical information to State Farm, which
plaintiff signed on August 8.
Id. at 125-126, Ex. 6.
10
On August 8, 1996, although she apparently did not have a scheduled appointment, plaintiff again
saw Dr. Husid. Depo. of Marc Husid at 38-39. According to Dr. Husid, plaintiff "came in in tears looking
quite distraught telling me that she attempted to return to work the day after I initially saw her but got sick
and had to leave and has not been able to return." Depo. of Marc Husid at 38-39. Plaintiff reported to Dr.
Husid that "She [was] concerned that she may lose her job. She [was] tired, she [was] stressed over her three
children, marital difficulties, and making her various doctor appointments. She complained of burning pain
up and down her back." Depo. of Marc Husid at 40.
Dr. Husid completed and signed a three page Medical Certification Form for State Farm on plaintiff
on August 8, 1996. Id. at 51-52, Pl.Ex. 2. The Medical Certification Form indicates a "Disability Start Date"
taking plaintiff off work from July 23, 1996 and indicating he would re-evaluate her on August 15, 1996.
Id. at 52-53, Pl.Ex. 2. Dr. Husid agrees with everything on the Medical Certification Form, as completed.
Id. at 52, Pl.Ex. 2. The Medical Certification Form indicated Dr. Husid's opinion that plaintiff had a serious
health condition under the FMLA and that plaintiff was unable to work from July 23, 1996 through August
15, 1996, at which time she would be "re-evaluated."
Id. at 52, Pl.Ex. 2, Depo. of Jean Estes, Ex. 7. The
Medical Certification Form indicated that plaintiff's serious health condition under the FMLA was "absence
plus treatment." Depo. of Jean Estes at 142-44, Ex. 7. The Medical Certification Form also indicated Dr.
Husid's opinion that plaintiff's treatments needed to be scheduled during normal work hours. Depo. of Marc
Husid at 52, Pl.Ex. 2; Depo. of Jean Estes, Ex. 7. State Farm received the Medical Certification Form in
response to Estes' request to plaintiff of August 5 on or before August 20, 1996. Depo. of Jean Estes at 126-
127, Ex. 7.
Dr. Husid again saw plaintiff on Monday, August 19, 1996, at which time he completed a medical
release to State Farm indicating that plaintiff should return to work the following Monday, August 26, 1996.
Depo. of Marc Husid at 47-48; Depo. of Jean Estes, Ex. 13.
11
State Farm determined plaintiff to be AWOL (absent without leave) for the days of August 16 and
19, 1996, on August 20, 1996. Depo. of Jean Estes, Ex. 9 & 19.
At some point after August 20, Estes spoke with Dr. Husid and was told that plaintiff was "in a lot
of pain" and that Dr. Husid was keeping plaintiff off work until August 26, 1996. Id. at 135-136, Ex. 8. Estes
was aware that the medical documents and excuses in plaintiff's file indicated a pattern of medical problems
arising from the auto accident, and that plaintiff was having ongoing problems, pain, chronic neck and back
pain and suffering from her injuries in the automobile accident.
Id. at 147-49, Ex. 7, 14, 15, 16 & 17. Such
documents would indicate to Estes that plaintiff had a continuing need for treatment for her injuries from the
auto accident.
Id. Such documents would indicate to Estes that plaintiff had a serious health condition under
the FMLA in August 1996.
Id.
When plaintiff failed to show up at work on the morning of August 26, 1996, Angela Graham
prepared a memorandum to Jan Youngman which recounted the plaintiff's absence from work since July 24,
1996, including the time she was deemed AWOL on August 16 and 19, 1996. Angela Graham recommended
that due to the "repeated incident of AWOL," the plaintiff should be terminated immediately.
Id. at 170-71,
Ex. 19; Depo. of A. Graham at 98, 119-21. The August 26 memo does not state that plaintiff's absences after
July 24, 1996 were non-FMLA protected. Depo. of Jean Estes, Ex. 19. Angela Graham's supervisors signed
the August 26 memo and fully agreed with it. Depo. of A. Graham at 124-125.
Plaintiff submitted a letter of resignation to State Farm effective August 26, 1996. Depo. of T.
Graham at 92-98, 106, Ex. 2. In her letter of resignation, plaintiff stated that:
I feel at this point after going through all the therapy that I have been through the ergonomics' of my
job, in the past have aggravated my conditions, causing me to have severe headaches, also the anxiety
and stress of everything concerning my condition. I have tried to sit down at a desk since school
started to help my children with their homework and I am having difficulty doing that. I want to
thank all my co-workers and State Farm. I apologize to all my fellow members as well as my friends
for the burdens I have placed upon them.
Depo. of T. Graham, Ex. 2.
II. Summary Judgment Standard.
12
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323,
106 S. Ct. 2548,
91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The movants can meet this burden
by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing that the nonmoving party
has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden
of proof.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23,
106 S. Ct. 2548. There is no requirement, however, "that the moving
party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim."
Id. at 323,
106 S. Ct. 2548.
Once the moving party has met his burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond
the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
of file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party need not present evidence in a form necessary for
admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his pleadings.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324,
106 S. Ct.
2548. "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Id.
at 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548.
After the plaintiff has properly responded to a proper motion for summary judgment, the court must
grant the motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
13
a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which
are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
106 S. Ct. 2505,
91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party."
Id. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505. "[T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."
Id. at 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505.
His guide is the same standard necessary to direct a verdict: "whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law."
Id. at 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505; see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,
461 U.S.
731, 745 n. 11,
103 S. Ct. 2161,
76 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1983). However, the nonmoving party "must do more than
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586,
106 S. Ct. 1348,
89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). If the evidence is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249,
106 S. Ct. 2505 (citations omitted); accord Spence v. Zimmerman,
873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir.1989).
Furthermore, the court must "view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary
burden," so there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254,
106 S. Ct. 2505; Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc.,
849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th
Cir.1988). Nevertheless, credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences
from the facts are the function of the jury, and therefore the evidence of the non-movants is to be believed
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255,
106 S. Ct. 2505. The
nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference. Brown
v. City of Clewiston,
848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n. 12 (11th Cir.1988).
III. Discussion.
Because this court's jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims depends on the viability of her claims
under the FMLA, the court will address the claims over which it has original jurisdiction before proceeding
14
to consider, if necessary, the state law claims. If no federal claim survives summary judgment, the court sees
no reason why the other claims should not be dismissed or remanded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
In deciding whether a plaintiff has stated a claim of FMLA discrimination based on circumstantial
evidence, courts have borrowed the analytical framework utilized in cases brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1325 (10th
Cir.1997); Dollar v. Shoney's, Inc.,
981 F. Supp. 1417, 1419 (N.D.Ala.1997); Kaylor v. Fannin Regional
Hospital, Inc.,
946 F. Supp. 988, 999 (N.D.Ga.1996); Peters v. Community Action Committee, Inc.,
977
F. Supp. 1428 (M.D.Ala.1997). Applying the test from McDonnell Douglas v. Green,
411 U.S. 792,
93 S. Ct.
1817,
36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), to the FMLA context, the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing
that: (1) she availed herself of a protected right under the FMLA; (2) she was adversely affected by an
employment decision; (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action; and (4) she was qualified for her position at the time of the adverse employment action.
See
Kaylor, 946 F. Supp. at 1001 (citing Stanfield v. Answering Service, Inc.,
867 F.2d 1290, 1293 (11th
Cir.1989)).
Plaintiff's second amended complaint, filed March 30, 1998, contains a lengthy list of FMLA
violations that State Farm is alleged to have committed. Among other things, plaintiff contends that State
Farm violated her rights under the FMLA and its implementing regulations by: (1) failing to inform her of
her rights under the FMLA; (2) interfering with her rights under the FMLA; (3) misrepresenting the FMLA
to her; (4) interfering or attempting to interfere with her medical treatment; (5) failing to determine that she
was entitled to FMLA leave; (6) plotting to terminate her employment at State Farm by making conditions
intolerable to the extent that plaintiff would resign; (7) constructively terminating plaintiff's employment;
(8) intimidating, harassing, and discriminating against her; and (9) retaliating against her for taking leave.
State Farm denies having violated the FMLA in any respect.
15
Although many of plaintiff's allegations are complex, this court need not address the alleged technical
violations of the FMLA in detail because plaintiff has simply failed to demonstrate that she suffered any
"adverse employment action" for purposes of stating a prima facie case under the FMLA. In support of her
claim that she was subject to an adverse employment action, plaintiff offers three possibilities: (1) the July
24, 1996 memorandum regarding her absences that was placed into her employee file; (2) the classification
of her absences of August 16 and 19, 1996, as time when she was AWOL; and (3) her constructive discharge.
The Eleventh Circuit recently joined the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in holding that Title VII's
protection against retaliatory discharge extends to adverse actions which fall short of ultimate employment
decisions. See Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453 (11th Cir.1998). Thus, actions such as
undeserved negative job evaluations, demotions, disadvantageous transfers, or toleration of harassment are
actionable under the retaliation clause. See
id. at 1456 (citing Yartzoff v. Thomas,
809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th
Cir.1987); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet,
74 F.3d 980, 984-86 (10th Cir.1996)). Of course, "some threshold
level of substantiality ... must be met for unlawful discrimination to be cognizable under the anti-retaliation
clause."
Id. The July 24, 1996 memorandum and the AWOL classification of the two days in August simply
do not meet the "threshold level of substantiality" required by the Eleventh Circuit in Wideman. Neither
action constitutes an unwarranted negative job evaluation or disadvantageous transfer of responsibilities. The
July memorandum merely expressed concern with plaintiff's absences and warned of possible ramifications;
and State Farm had ample reason to classify plaintiff's August absences as being "without leave" since
plaintiff had presented an excuse note that only extended through August 15, 1996 and State Farm didn't hear
from plaintiff until August 20, 1998. In addition, plaintiff did not suffer any repercussions from either of
these actions. In such circumstances, courts have generally found no adverse employment action. See Green
v. Runyon,
131 F.3d 151 (10th Cir.1997); Sweeney v. West,
149 F.3d 550, 556 (7th Cir. June 29, 1998);
Nelson v. University of Maine System,
923 F. Supp. 275 (D.Maine 1996); Rivers v. Baltimore Dep't of
Recreation Parks,
1990 WL 112429, *10 (D.Md. Jan.9, 1990).
16
Plaintiff's claim that she was constructively discharged is similarly untenable. The Eleventh Circuit
has instructed that in order to prove constructive discharge, an employee "must demonstrate that [her]
working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person in [her] position would be compelled to
resign." Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir.1993). Plaintiff is patently unable to meet this standard.
While she alleges that the July 24, 1996, memorandum led her to believe that she was going to be terminated
if she missed any more days of work, a reading of that memorandum illustrates clearly that the belief was not
reasonable2—plaintiff's subjective feelings about State Farm's actions, whatever they may have been, are not
determinative. Doe v. Dekalb County School Dist.,
145 F.3d 1441, 1450 (11th Cir.1998). It is undisputed
that plaintiff did not know of Angela Graham's recommendation that she be terminated when she resigned.
Furthermore, plaintiff's letter of resignation, in which she expressly thanks State Farm, does not by its terms
lend support to a theory that plaintiff was forced to resign due to "intolerable" working conditions. See Depo.
of T. Graham, Ex. 2.
Besides failing to show that she was subject to an adverse employment action, plaintiff has not
demonstrated that she suffered any damages as a result of State Farm's actions. Even if the defendants have
committed certain technical infractions under the FMLA, plaintiff may not recover in the absence of damages.
See Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 152 F.3d 723,
1998 WL 498544 (7th Cir. Aug.19, 1998); Beal v. Rubbermaid
Commercial Prod., Inc.,
972 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.Iowa 1997), aff'd,
149 F.3d 1186 (8th Cir.1998); Szabo v.
Trustees of Boston University,
1998 WL 151272 (D.Mass. Mar.18, 1998); Dodgens v. Kent Mfg. Co.,
955
F. Supp. 560, 564-65 (D.S.C.1997); Fisher v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
999 F. Supp. 866,
871 (E.D.Tex.1998). Plaintiff was never denied leave time by State Farm. In fact, she was provided with
more than 170 hours of leave in the 12 months between her automobile accident and her resignation, most
of which was paid. As this court has noted, the FMLA does not allow recovery for mental distress or the loss
2
The memo states in relevant part: "Further non-FMLA protected absences could directly affect all future
permission policy absences and result in disciplinary action. As your supervisor, I am available at all times
to help you resolve this concern." Depo. of T. Graham at 141-43, Ex. 7.
17
of job security. McAnnally v. Wyn South Molded Prods., 912 F. Supp. 512 (N.D.Ala.1996). And, as discussed
earlier, plaintiff cannot make a claim of actual or constructive discharge.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted and the
remaining state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
A separate order, consistent with this opinion, will be entered.
18
